In an applied ethics course I taught many times at Arizona State University, I had my students read the following article:
McNaughton D. and Rawling P. 2007. Deontology. In LaFollette H (ed.). 2007. Ethics in Practice: Third Edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell, chapter 2, pp. 31-44.
This is a version of the notes I took on that article for my students. I am continuing to update the notes occasionally, even though right now I no longer work for ASU or teach this course.
The two classes of ethical theory that we are covering before we move into applied issues are consequentialism and deontology. Last time, we looked at Vallentyne's article on consequentialism. Now we turn to McNaughton and Rawling's article on deontology.
McNaughton and Rawling's (hence MR) article does several things:
These notes will discuss the first two items in the list above.
The term options is unfortunate, because it is vague. What MR have in mind can be characterized in two ways, which amount to the same thing: (1) the option to produce less than the maximal amount of good you are able to, or (2) the option to produce more good than you are morally required to. MR contend that consequentialism always requires one to produce as much good as possible, so it leaves one without such options. Deontology, on the other hand, allows for such options since it is not centrally concerned with consequences.
There is an interesting contrast with Vallentyne at this point, because in Vallentyne's account many consequentialist theories do allow for options: only maximizing forms of consequentialism, such as utilitarianism, preclude options. I will leave it to you to decide whether you think MR might have something deeper in mind that cannot be captured by any consequentialist theory.
Consequentialism does not accord any special inherent status to familial relationships or to institutions like promise-keeping: whether or not one ought to treat one's friends and family, or those with whom one has made a contract, differently than one treats complete strangers on the other side of the world depends, from a consequentialist perspective, on what the consequences would be either way. This seems wrong to MR: they believe that one ought to give special treatment to one's friends and family even it ends up making the world worse than it otherwise would be. Likewise, they believe that (at least in general) one ought to keep one's promises even when one can produce more good in the world by breaking a promise (and that one ought to keep them not simply because a general institution of promise-keeping has good consequences).
MR's extended treatment of friendship, towards the end of the article, is supposed to drive home the point: true friendship seems to give us fundamental, not derivative, obligations to our friends. If we decide to honor our obligations to our friends only because, at root, doing so will produce a certain quantity of good in the world, then we are (say MR) missing the whole point of friendship. But, consequentialism appears to analyze the friendship in precisely this way. If we agree that true friendship, as defined by MR, is part of a moral life (or even that it can be), then this presents a problem for consequentialism.
Is it permissible to murder one innocent person in order to prevent the murder of a thousand innocent people? Are there things that just never can be done, no matter how good the consequences are? MR end up rejecting this idea, but many deontologists hold to it, and consider the possibility of inviolable constraints on action a defining difference between deontology and consequentialism. I won't test you on whether you understand the details of MR's argument against constraints, because it seems to me to be a deceptively slippery argument; I would, however, like you to think about it, as I encourage you to think about everything in this class.
Rule consequentialism may seem to place some constraints upon actions, but MR emphasize that these are not the kinds of constraints they have in mind; MR want fundamental constraints. Rule consequentialist constraints are not fundamental: they emerge from a deeper rule which does not itself accept constraints. It is perhaps enough for us to see this if we ask what rule consequentialists would say if the world were such that committing a random murder every year actually would increase general well-being significantly. Presumably, if the world worked that way, at least some varieties of rule consequentialism would encourage periodic murder instead of forbidding it. This, clearly, is not good enough for MR.
MR believe that all three of the factors discussed above can be summed up in terms of what they call agent-relativity. The essence of agent-relative theories is that they allow the decision-making agent to accord fundamental (not just derivative) importance to their status, their interests, and their relations. By contrast, agent-neutral theories require one to remain fundamentally (in MR's sense, explained in the previous paragraph) neutral between one's own status, interests, and relations, and those of everyone else.
As MR explain, options do not have to be agent-relative, but they often are, since one of the reasons for introducing options is that the requirement that one always maximize the good is too demanding on individuals. It is not just (as consequentialists might argue) that being required to always choose the very best will make one less efficient at producing good in the long run; rather, the idea is that one ought, simply as a fundamental matter of right, to be able to pursue one's own good, even at some (but not too much) cost to the greater good.
Special relationships and special obligations are agent-relative: one is required to favor one's own family and friends over strangers to some degree, even at some cost to the greater good. Likewise, to make a promise to someone is to give that person a special claim on one's actions, even if the greater good could be served by breaking that promise.
Finally, constraints are agent-relative, because they quite simply bar the agent from doing certain things, even if the consequence is that other people will end up doing more of the forbidden kind of action. A constraint on murder would forbid you to murder someone, even if you could prevent a million murders by doing so: the important thing, for deontological theories that embrace this kind of constraint, is not the number of murders in the world, but whether or not you commit one.
First published: 2010
Last updated: 21 Nov 2014
Copyright © 2017, Mark Vuletic. All rights reserved.